As computing becomes increasingly pervasive, di erent heterogeneous networks are connected and integrated. is is especially true in the Internet of ings (IoT) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) se ings. However, as di erent networks managed by di erent parties and with di erent security requirements are integrated, security becomes a primary concern. WSN nodes, in particular, are o en deployed "in the open", where a potential a acker can gain physical access to the device. As nodes can be deployed in hostile or di cult scenarios, such as military ba le elds or disaster recovery se ings, it is crucial to avoid escalation from successful a acks on a single node to the whole network, and from there to other connected networks. It is therefore crucial to secure the communication within the WSN, and in particular, maintain context information, such as the network topology and the location and identity of base stations (which collect data gathered by the sensors) private.
INTRODUCTION
A acks against smart devices, sensor networks and the Internet of ings (IoT) are increasing in both frequency and magnitude. In particular, malware, intended as malicious so ware or hardware, poses a signi cant security threat. As recently discovered by Kryptowire, a company operating in the cybersecurity eld, more than 700 million phones, cars and other smart devices running the Android operating system were compromised and equipped with malware capable of stealing every kind of information the device was able to deal with (including les stored on the device or the messages sent from the device to one another) [10] . e malware, allegedly developed by Shanghai Adups Technology Company, sent massive amounts of sensitive data about the devices and their users' activities back to servers in China. is latest example proves that commonly adopted business models in smart devices industry are inadequate and potentially dangerous, as the devices are usually not engineered following an e ective security strategy. As such, they are a preferred target for cybercrime groups, which can exploit their ubiquity to build botnets or, in case they are deployed as part of critical or sensitive infrastructure, to compromise the regular work ow of the network and infrastructure itself [17] .
e emerging security threat, however, is not slowing the growing di usion of systems and services based on IoT and heterogeneous sensor networks, propelled by the relentless advances in the production of low-cost embedded devices and sensors. As these technologies are usually deployed in wireless environments, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have become a suitable solution for an increasing number of applications, including health monitoring, smart agriculture, weather sensing, intrusion detection applications and industrial control [7, 12] . In urban and suburban contexts, these networks are o en connected one to each other, enabling management control over complex scenarios. However, in spite of the extensive research in the area, the Internet of ings and in particular the interconnection of WSNs still face many security and privacy challenges [11] . e wireless nature of the communication link makes the network inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping. Moreover, IoT and WSN nodes are o en deployed in unsecured areas or outdoor, where they can be subject to tampering, and a potential a acker might be able to gain control of one or more nodes. For this reason, the security of the network should be preserved even in the presence of internal adversaries. In particular, both the communication between the nodes and the context information (including the location of the nodes and the network organization) should be protected [11] .
In order to preserve the privacy of the communication, nodes can employ encrypted communication protocols when feasible, due to the low-power nature and limited computational capabilities of most devices. With regard to context privacy, instead, the primary aim is to hide the location and identity of the nodes in the network, as well the overall the network structure and topology [3] . is is crucial especially in WSNs, which are in general highly vulnerable to a acks targeted at base stations (the nodes collecting the data gathered by the sensors). In fact, failure of a base station can disrupt network operation, making it an ideal target for an a acker. In order to prevent adversaries from launching both remote, so warebased a acks and physical a acks the location of base stations and the network topology should be therefore concealed [4] . A basic strategy to achieve this is ooding and transmissions of fake or dummy packets, which make network tra c observation more di cult [19] . More complex strategies include the use of random walks to route packets anonymously [9] . Random walks have been adopted in a number of designs: Zhang proposed self-adjusting directed random walks in [20] , while GROW (Greedy Random Walk) [18] introduced a two-way random walk, from both source and destination, that can reduce the chance of an eavesdropper being able to collect location information. Finally, layers of encryption can be used to protect the information at each hop in the walk [5] . More recently, advanced anonymity techniques have been applied to IoT and WSN, and in particular onion routing protocols derived from Tor [14] .
Contribution
In this paper we introduce a novel anonymous routing mechanism, based on the Spatial Bloom Filter data structure and homomorphic encryption. e proposed construction is targeted at preserving context privacy within a network composed of a number of interconnected subetworks. In particular, our construction can nd direct application in all the se ings where di erent networks, such as wireless sensor networks or networks of smart or embedded devices, are connected to form a larger network. e anonymous routing mechanism achieves the following goals: encrypt communication between nodes; hide the identity and location of the sending and receiving nodes in a communication between two di erent subnetworks; hide the network structure and topology to all the nodes; and hide the origin and destination of any communication between subnetworks to the routing layer (that is, the network infrastructure that connects the di erent subnetworks and is responsible for the routing of packets between them). ese properties enable context privacy and security against adversaries who control one or more nodes within the network, and prevent a acks aimed at taking over control of the network.
PRELIMINARIES
In the following we present the main building blocks of the proposed routing mechanism: rst, the Spatial Bloom Filter (SBF) [2, 15] . Second, the homomorphic encryption operations that make it possible to compute the SBF in the encrypted domain. For the la er, we base our construction on the Paillier cryptosystem [13] , although any equivalent alternative cipher may be used.
Spatial Bloom Filters
A Bloom Filter (BF) is a data structure that represents a set of elements in a space-e cient manner [1] . Bloom lters are widely used in networking protocols, and have a variety of network security applications [8] . Recently, Calderoni, et al. proposed a compact data structure based on Bloom lters, designed to store location information [2, 15] . e structure, called Spatial Bloom Filter (SBF), was originally designed for location privacy applications. Two private positioning protocols were proposed with the SBF, both aimed at Figure 1: Sets ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 and ∆ 3 (representing three subnetworks) are used to construct a SBF. ree hash functions are used to map each element into the lter. In the rst step of this example, the identi ers of two nodes belonging to ∆ 1 are processed by the hash functions, resulting in the value '1' being written six times into the SBF. e construction proceeds likewise for elements of ∆ 2 and ∆ 3 . Two kinds of collisions are possible, as highlighted: the rst is intra set; the second takes place when elements of sets marked with a greater label overwrite those with a lower value. e probability of both events can be controlled to prevent false positives.
keeping both the user's exact position and the provider's monitored areas private.
e SBF was recently evaluated in a comparative assessment with other similar privacy-preserving techniques, showing promising properties in several domains [16] . In particular, the SBF is suitable for application beyond the location privacy eld. In this paper, we use the SBF to build a novel private routing protocol for interconnected networks, a typical scenario in the IoT and distributed sensor networks domain. In the following, we brie y review the data structure and its properties relevant to the proposed construction; a full de nition and discussion can be found in [2, 15] .
A Spatial Bloom Filter extends the original Bloom Filter idea in order to support several sets composed of elements belonging to a speci c domain E. A SBF can be used to perform membership queries on the originating set of elements without knowledge of the set itself but, contrary to the BF, a SBF can be constructed over multiple sets. erying a Spatial Bloom Filter for an element returns the identi er of the speci c set among all the originating sets in which the element is contained, minus a false positive probability.
e SBFs hold several probabilistic properties useful to control the false positive probability throughout the originating sets.
An SBF can be de ned as follows: let E be a domain speci c set of elements (in this paper elements represent the IDs of network nodes) and let S = {∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . . , ∆ s } be a set of subsets such that ∆ i ⊆ E and S is a partition of the union setS = ∆ i ∈S ∆ i . Let O be the strict total order over S for which ∆ i < ∆ j for i < j. We de ne the Spatial Bloom Filter over (S, O) as the set of pairs
where H = {h 1 , . . . , h k } is a set of k hash functions such that each h i ∈ H : {0, 1} * → {1, . . . , m}, that is, the hash functions take binary strings as input and output a number uniformly chosen in {1, . . . , m}. A spatial Bloom lter B # (S, O) can be represented as a vector b # composed of m values, where the i-th value
In the following, when referring to a SBF, we refer to its vector representation b # . e construction of an SBF starts by se ing all values in b # to 0.
en, starting from the rst set ∆ 1 , each element belonging to the set is processed by each function h ∈ H . Let us suppose h (δ ) = i: in that case, the i-th value of b # will be set to 1 (as 1 is the label associated to ∆ 1 ). Elements belonging to subsequent sets (∆ 2 , . . . , ∆ s ) are processed likewise. It is important to note that collisions between two distinct values are subject to the SBF collision rule: labels with higher value overwrite those with lesser value. is procedure is exempli ed in Figure 1 .
In order to check whether or not an element δ u is member of the set ∆ i ∈ S, two conditions need to be met:
0 for each hash function, then δ u is a member of the set ∆ i minus a false positive probability; i is the lesser value among those returned by the set of hash functions.
Homomorphic encryption
e Paillier cryptosystem [13] is an asymmetric encryption scheme featuring notable homomorphic properties. Speci cally, in this paper we rely on the additive homomorphism of the Paillier encryption function over Z n , which leads to several identities, among which we recall:
is multiplicative property ensures that an encrypted plaintext raised to the power of a constant k will decrypt to the product of the plaintext and k.
In the proposed protocol, we apply this multiplicative scheme on a vector basis, achieving a secure entrywise product (also known as Hadamard product). We refer to this operation as to Private Hadamard Product, and we represent it with .
We note here that the Paillier cryptosystem may not be suitable for some heavily computationally constrained devices: however, the proposed protocol can be achieved over any additively homomorphic cipher.
A SECURE ROUTING STRATEGY
We study a se ing where di erent, heterogeneous subnetworks are interconnected, creating a larger network. e subnetworks are connected to each other by the routing layer, that is, the part of the overarching network infrastructure that manages and routes inter-network communication. Each subnetwork is composed of multiple nodes, and can be connected to the routing layer either directly, or through one or more gateways. In the case of Wireless Sensor Networks, these gateways could also represent the base
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Figure 2: A sample sensor network composed of three subnetworks ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 and ∆ 3 . Each subnetwork, composed by a set of nodes, represents an Area of Interest (AOI) as described in [2, 15] , and is marked with a label. Anonymous routing of packets between the subnetworks (done by the routing layer) is achieved using an SBF representing the network.
stations (where information from the sensor node is collected). e aim of our construction is to enable private routing between the subnetworks. In particular, we want to prevent an a acker that controls one or more nodes of the network from being able to learn the topology and structure of the network. Speci cally, he should not be able to: determine the number of subnetworks, other than those where he controls a node; the location of any node in the network, that is, to which subnetwork a node belongs. We de ne the security of our construction as follows:
Security De nition. Private routing between di erent subnetworks in a wider network is achieved when: any node in the network only needs the ID's of other nodes in order to communicate with them, and learns nothing about their position within the network; for each packet received, the routing layer learns only the subnetwork to which the packet should be routed, and nothing about the identity of the sending and receiving nodes. Any subnetwork gateway only routes packets transparently between the subnetwork and the routing layer, and, similarly to other nodes in the subnetwork, learns nothing about the positions of nodes outside its subnetwork.
e security of the construction is analysed in Section 4.
Routing strategy
Each node of the network is identi ed by a unique, random ID. Contrary to the IP address, the ID does not contain or imply any information regarding the network structure. Within the network, nodes communicate using their respective IDs, following a tunneling and encapsulation strategy for lower level protocols (such as TCP/IP) similar to the one used in other private-preserving protocols, including onion routing [6] . In practice, communication between nodes of the network is rst tunneled to the local gateway, then from the gateway to the routing layer, from then to the destination gateway and nally to the destination node. Gateways do not have an active role, and they only relay communication between the nodes in their subnetwork and the routing layer transparently. In general, each party in the communication will not reveal unnecessary information to the following one. e gateway of the sending node, in particular, will not communicate the ID of the node to the routing layer. As the receiving gateway does not know to which node in its subnetwork the communication is destined to, it broadcasts the packets to all nodes in the receiving subnetwork. Since communication is encrypted (as explained in the following), only the intended receiver will be able to decrypt the information. An example of network structure is presented in Figure 2 .
Packets and routing information
Messages transmi ed through the network using the anonymous routing protocol are composed of two parts: a header, which contains routing information; and a payload, which is encrypted and encapsulates the communication being anonymously routed (in practice, the payload contain packets of lower layer protocols such as UDP or TCP). In order to encrypt the payload, we assume that each node in the network has a public/private key pair, and a key distribution mechanism exists between the nodes, so that each node knowing another node's ID either knows or can retrieve the node's public key as well. Encryption of the payload is performed by the sending node s using the public key Pk r of the receiving node r , which can then decrypt the transmission using its secret key Sk r . As communication is routed anonymously, the ID of the sender is included in the encrypted payload as well, in order for the receiving node to be able to respond. e use of random IDs to identify the nodes removes the need to know the destination IP address in order to initiate communication, and hides the originating IP. It also means that no communication is possible without knowledge of the ID of the destination node. However, in order for the routing to be anonymous, the header does not include the ID of the sending and receiving nodes, but only routing information in the form of an homomorphically encrypted SBF. In particular, the network maintainer builds an SBF representing all the nodes in the network and their respective subnetwork. As shown in Figure 1 , the elements of the set over which the SBF is built are the IDs of the nodes, while the sets are the subnetworks, each represented by a label. e SBF built this way, b # , is encrypted using a homomorphic encryption scheme, as explained in Section 2.1. In this construction we use the Paillier cryptosystem [13] , but any cipher with equivalent homomorphic properties can be used. In particular, other more lightweight cryptosystems could be more suitable for resource-constrained devices. e secret key Sk # of the homomorphic key pair is known by the routing layer, while the public key Pk # and the encrypted lter Enc P k # b # are distributed to all the nodes. e nodes also know the set of hash functions used in constructing the lter. Table 1 summarizes the information that each party in the protocol needs in order to communicate. e information is divided in two sets: information related to the encryption mechanism (such as public keys), in the upper row; and information related to network communication (including IDs and IP addresses), in the lower row. In this paper, we assume that knowledge of the ID of a node equates to knowledge of its public key: any suitable key distribution scheme can be applied to achieve this.
Routing protocol
In the follwing, we describe the communication between a sender node s and a receiver node r in two di erent subnetworks (∆ s and ∆ i respectively) over the anonymous routing protocol. is process is visible in Figure 3 .
Communication happens as follows:
Enc P k r (ID s |ms ) P Figure 3 : Operation of the private routing protocol. Node s wants to securely transmit message ms to node r . Node r belongs to subnetwork i, but s only knows r 's ID (I D r ). Communication proceeds as follows: s generates the SBF related to I D r and counts the number z of non-zero values in it; the lter is then multiplied (through an homomorphic encryption operation) by the shared encrypted lter b # . e resulting lter is then sent to the routing layer, together with z. e routing layer decrypts it, and computes the destination subnetwork i. e payload (that is, the encrypted message) is then routed to the subnetwork i and node r , either through a gateway or by broadcast. r receives the message and decrypts it.
(1) e sender node s identi es the anonymous identi er ID r of the receiving node r . s then builds an SBF with ID r as only element, using the set of hash functions and counting the number z of non-zero values in the resulting lter. en, the node multiplies the lter it just built by the encrypted lter Enc P k # b # , using the multiplicative properties of the cryptosystem. We call the resulting combined encrypted lter e # . e sender shu es e # , and sends it to the gateway, with z and the encrypted payload Enc P k r (ms ). (2) e sending gateway relays transparently the information received by s to the routing layer. (3) e routing layer decrypts e # : the decrypted lter is composed of zeros, and a number of non-zero values i. If the number of i's is equal to z, then the receiving node r exists.
e value i identi es the correct subnetwork to which the communication will be routed. In case of di ering values, the smallest is used (see Section 2 for an explanation). Finally the routing layer transmits the encrypted payload Enc P k r (ms ) to the correct subnetwork ∆ i . (4) e gateway of ∆ i receives the encrypted payload and brodcasts it to all the nodes in the subnetwork. (5) e intended receiver r receives Enc P k r (ms ) and decrypts it using its secret key Sk r . e properties of the Spatial Bloom Filters introduce the possibility of false positives, with two possible scenarios: rst, an element outside the sets over which the lter has been built could be recognized as member of a set; second, an element that is a member of a set X could be recognized as member of set Y .
e former case has no real implications for the proposed protocol: it would only apply to the case of a node in the network using non-existing or unknown IDs. But as no public key is associated to these IDs, communication is impossible. e la er case could result in the wrong routing being applied to the communication: however, we note that the probability of this event can be calibrated through the use of appropriate parameters (such as the length of the lter and the number of hash functions) during the lter construction, and a lter can be tested a er it has been built to verify that no false positive (in the sense of wrong recognition) is possible.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to analyse the security of our construction, we discuss three separate scenarios: in the rst, an a acker gains control over a node in the network; in the second, the a acker controls a subnetwork gateway, and in the third, the a acker controls the routing layer (or part of it). In all three cases, we assume the a acker will not actively disrupt network tra c, but will limit himself to observing tra c visible to him in order to learn information on the network structure and topology (context information). is is called a semi-honest behaviour. In the following, we show how in each of the three cases the a acker is unable to learn any meaningful information on the network structure, and therefore the security de nition is satis ed. Security cannot be guaranteed in case the a acker controls simultaneously 1) the routing layer and 2) either one or more nodes, or one or more gateways, or a combination of the two. e extent to which security is compromised in this case depends on the number of nodes and gateways controlled, and is limited to the parts of the network the a acker has visibility of.
A acker controlling a node. In this case, the a acker can read all information sent and received by the node, and learns the IDs of all the other nodes with which the controlled node can communicate. e a acker also learns the encrypted lter, but has no information to decrypt it. e a acker cannot learn the IP addresses corresponding to the nodes, as they are unknown to the controlled node and cannot be derived from the respective IDs. Similarly, the a acker cannot learn the network structure (the position of the nodes within the subnetworks and the number of subnetworks), as the routing of sent and received packets is achieved anonymously.
A acker controlling a subnetwork gateway. An a acker controlling a gateway will learn all the identity of all the nodes in the respective subnetwork. However, he will not be able to read any information sent and received by the nodes, as the payloads are encrypted. Similarly, he will not learn the destination of sent packets or the origin of received ones, as the routing information e # is encrypted. Finally, the a acker cannot learn the network structure as per the case above.
A acker controlling the routing layer. In this case, the a acker will be able to watch the ow of information between the di erent subnetworks. However, due to the properties of the SBF, even being able to decrypt the encrypted routing information e # will not enable him to learn the identity of the receiving node r . Similarly, he cannot learn the identity of the sending node s, as this is encrypted within the payload, and the sending gateway will not communicate it to him.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a private routing protocol that can be used to communicate anonymously between di erent networks. Our protocol can be applied in a variety of Internet of ings scenarios: from Wireless Sensor Networks, to interconnected IoT systems composed by di erent devices or infrastructures.
Our protocols achieves context privacy by using homomorphic encryption, tunneling and the Spatial Bloom Filters. In particular, we achieve the following properties: communication between nodes can only be read by the intended receiver; the network structure and topology (context information) is kept private to all nodes; the identity and location of the sending and receiving nodes in two di erent subnetworks is kept private to the routing layer; and the routing layer is oblivious to the origin and destination of any communication between subnetworks.
ese properties enable context privacy and security against adversaries who control one or more nodes within the network, or even the routing layer.
erefore, the proposed anonymous routing protocol can prevent a acks aimed at taking over control of the network.
